题目：

第一部分：经济增长中的驼峰形趋势

第二部分：竞争与差异：关于美国医院采用“电子医疗记录”技术的研究

主讲人：黄宗晔（首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院助理教授）

       王艳菲（首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院助理教授）

时间：2013年12月18日（周三）下午1:30

地点：国际经管学院会议室（诚明楼三层）

主办方：国际经管学院

Part One

The Hump-shaped Patterns during Economic Growth

Zongye Huang

Abstract：A striking feature of the structural change literature is that manufacturing employment exhibits a hump-shaped pattern during economic growth. In addition, empirical observations reveal that investment rates also follow a similar hump pattern. In this paper, we provide an analytical model of structural change and propose the modernization of agriculture as the fundamental mechanism that forms both of these hump-shaped patterns simultaneously. Unique to our model is the emphasis on the role of capital accumulation in such a process. As workers leave the traditional agriculture sector and entering the modern sectors, their demand for capital goods temporally raises the investment rate. Since the majority of capital goods comes from the manufacturing sector, the manufacturing employment share would first rise, then decline and converge to its long run steady state along a generalized balanced growth path as defined by Kongsamut et al. (2001).

经济增长中的驼峰形趋势

黄宗晔

摘要：在经济发展的过程中，很多关键的经济变量都呈现出类似驼峰形的变化趋势，比如，制造业就业比例和固定资产投资比例随着一国收入的增加，都会先增长，然后再逐步减少。在本文中，利用一般均衡的分析框架，我们认为农业生产的现代化过程可以很好的解释这类相似变化趋势。在这个包括经济增长与结构转型的过程中，我们强调资本积累的作用。如果传统农业生产技术是劳动密集型，而现代化农业生产依赖生产性资本，那么劳动力在离开传统农业进入现代农业生产的过程中，对资本品的需求量会增加。由于资本品主要是由制造业提供的，那么制造业的就业比例也会随之上升。当经济体实现了全面的工业化，对资本品的需求也就逐步减少，资本积累与制造业就业的比例也会随之降低。而模型中经济体的长期增长在一定假设条件下可以满足KongsamutRebelo和Xie（2001）提出的广义平衡增长路径条件（Generalized Balanced Growth Path）。

主讲人简介

 黄宗晔，首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院助理教授，博士毕业于麦吉尔大学，主要研究方向为Open Economy Macroeconomics, Monetary Economics, Economic Growth。

Part Two

Competition and Differentiation: The Multilevel Adoption

of Electronic Medical Records in U.S. Hospitals

Yanfei Wang

Abstract：This paper studies the diffusion of Electronic Medical Records (EMR) technology among U.S. hospitals. EMR adoption is a multilevel process, and I separate each level to examine hospitals' adoption behavior. I develop a dynamic adoption game, taking the strategic interactions of forward-looking hospitals into account. Using a panel data of U.S. hospitals’ adoption from 1999 to 2008, and applying the methods developed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), I recover revenue and cost parameters for each adoption level. I find the presence of differentiation, that is, hospitals are less likely to adopt the level that more hospitals adopted. This result is consistent with the theory of product differentiation, but challenges the expectation that hospitals may coordinate on one level, given EMR is a network technology. Recent U.S. policy establishes an incentive program for the adoption of EMR technology. This paper may have policy implications for nationwide EMR adoption, as well as insights for other multilevel technology diffusion.

竞争与差异：关于美国医院采用“电子医疗记录”技术的研究

王艳菲

摘要：这篇论文研究了美国医院采用“电子医疗记录”这项技术的过程。电子医疗记录技术的安装采用需要多阶段，本文研究了医院每一阶段的决策。通过1999年到2008年间美国医院决策记录的面板数据，以及参照Bajari，Benkard，和Levin (2007) 的估计方法，本研究构建了一个动态的结构性模型，以估计这项技术的采用过程，并重点分析医院之间由于竞争产生的决策影响。本研究发现医院在决定安装该技术的何种阶段时，会避免与其它医院相同。该发现与竞争的“产品差异化”理论是一致的。近年来美国的医疗改革中有一系列促进该技术普及的奖惩措施。本文的结果为相关政策的研究，以及其它多阶段技术的采用过程，提供了新的分析视角。

主讲人简介

 王艳菲，首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院助理教授，博士毕业于波士顿大学，主要研究方向为Industrial organization, Health Economics, Applied Econometrics。